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I.  INTRODUCTION
The American farmer is plagued with surpluses. Even if we suffered
a  crop failure,  we  in the  United States  would  have enough wheat  on
hand to last us over  two years.  We would  have enough  corn to last  us
about half a  year.  And we would have enough  cotton to last us nearly
a year.  But much of the world  is suffering  from  agricultural shortages.
Can't this  dilemma be resolved?
The  dual purpose of getting  rid of farm surpluses  and at the  same
time  helping  other  countries  with  economic  development  gives  the
farmer a direct interest  in foreign  affairs.  Perhaps we can better under-
stand the farmer's interest  in world affairs if we take  a look at the goal
of our foreign policy and alternatives for reaching this goal.  But first of
all  let's  take  a look at some background  information  on  this world  in
which we live.
II.  HOW  THE  UNITED  STATES
FITS  INTO  THE  PUZZLE  OF  TODAY'S  WORLD
Foreign  policy  is  a  course  of  action  that  we  in  the  United  States
adopt-a  course  of  action  which  will  have  some  influence  on  foreign
people. If we as a nation must conceive  of a policy with regard  to other
nations,  we might do well to see just how  our country fits  into the total
puzzle  of today's world.  So  let's catch  a glimpse  of some of the  major
economic  and  political facts  of today's world.
Figure  13 shows you each continent with its area in correct propor-
tion  to  every  other  continent.  For instance,  Greenland  isn't all  out  of
size relative  to Africa,  as  it is  on some  maps.
Now, let's put some data on this map. Let's see where you could go
if you  were  traveling  by train or auto  (Figure 2).  You  could drive to
Alaska,  but you couldn't drive  to Argentina.  Of course,  if you had an
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Figure  1
SOURCE:  Woytinsky  and Woytinsky,  World  Commerce and Governments,  Trends
and Outlook, Twentieth  Century  Fund, New York,  1955, p.  1.
AREAS  READILY  ACCESSIBLE  BY
RAILWAYS  AND  HIGHWAYS,  1954
Figure 2
SOURCE:  World Commerce and Governments, p.  317.
amphibious  jeep,  you  might  make  it  (and you  might  also  be  able  to
make some  money writing articles  about your experiences).
64Much  of the world  is without  the kind  of transportation  that you
and I take for granted. If you want to go overland from Ghana to Egypt,
you have your choice of airplane, boat, or camel back. Look at the large
desert areas of Central Asia, where  non-mechanical means of transpor-
tation  (camels,  donkeys, people)  still carry most of the  goods.
We  here  in  the  United  States  think  nothing  of  getting  up  in  the
morning  and  driving miles  to an extension  meeting,  but if we  lived  in
many parts of the world we couldn't do this-we'd have to walk.
Now,  let's  look  at  the  world  from  the  standpoint  of  population.
Where  do the  people  live?  Here  we have  a map  picturing  each conti-
nent, not the same relative  size  as its area, but the same relative  size as
its  population  (Figure  3).
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Figure  3
SOURCE:  Woytinsky  and  Woytinsky,  World  Population and Production, Trends
and Outlook, Twentieth  Century  Fund, New  York,  1953,  lxxi.
The little country over on the left which looks like a midget United
States  is the United States. Population-wise,  we are just "small stuff" by
world standards. Latin America and Africa also have small populations
by world standards,  whereas  Europe appears well populated.  The big-
gest chunk  of the world's population,  however,  lives  in Asia.  Just two
Asian countries,  China and India,  contain one-third of the world's pop-
ulation.
Let's  take  another  look  at  the  world.  This  time  let's  make  each
country the same relative size  as  its income  (Figure  4).
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Figure 4
SOURCE:  World Commerce and Governments, p.  1.
That big, pot-bellied country over on the left is "us."  We have about
40 percent of the world's income.  Latin America and Africa don't have
much of the  world's income,  whereas  Europe is rather well off.  But in
Asia, even when you multiply the vast numbers of people by the income
per person,  the  total income  doesn't  amount to much by world stand-
ards. It seems that Europe and the United States have almost a monop-
oly  on  income.  If you  combined  the  income  of  these  two  areas,  you
would have about two-thirds  of the world's  income.
Two-thirds  of the  world's  income  on  two continents-Europe  and
North America.  One-third of the world's  people in two countries-India
and  China.  That's something  to keep  in mind.
Another  way to  look at world income  figures would  be  to  classify
countries  by per  capita  income.  We might divide  the countries  of the
world into classes  as the sociologists  divide the people  in a community.
Arbitrarily, we could call  those countries  with an annual  per capita in-
come  over  $500  upper  class,  those with  an annual  per  capita  income
between  $100  and  $500  middle  class,  and  those  with  an  annual  per
capita income under $100  lower class  (Figure 5).
By now we're beginning to  get a geographic  picture of the location
of the developed and  underdeveloped  areas.  But we can  plot other sig-
nificant  data on world maps. Let's  look at exports  (Figure  6).
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Annual  income per  capita was estimated  by  dividing national  income by  population
using standard exchange  rates except where multiple rates exist.
SOURCE:  United  Nations,  Le  Comptes  Economizues  de  la  Tunisie,  Royaume  de
Tunisie,  Presidence  du  Conseil,  Service  des  Statistique;  Digest  of  Colonial  Statistics,
H  M  Stationery  Office,  as  quoted  in "Economic  Development  Assistance,"  Committee
for  Economic  Development,  1957,  pp.  8-9;  National  Industrial  Conference  Board,
Economic Almanac,  1956,  T.  Y.  Crowell,  New  York,  1957,  p.  540;  occasional  extra-
polations  by  Phillips Foster.
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Figure 6
SOURCE:  World Commerce and Governments, p.  61.
67This map shows each country the same relative size as its exports in
1952.  A map like this on imports would look essentially the same. The
United  States  is a powerful  country in terms of world trade.
In dollar value traded,  wheat is the most important  commodity en-
tering international trade.  Again, the United States  is a powerful coun-
try.  We're  so powerful,  in fact,  that we can afford  to give away or sell
at discount  large quantities  of our agricultural  surplus  (Figure  7).
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Figure 7
SOURCE:  World Commerce and Governments,  p.  140.
Now,  let's begin to  fit a few  things together.
The Indo-China  complex,  Burma, and Thailand  are the major rice
exporters  of Asia.  They have  a long history of trade with rice-deficient
India and Japan.  Rice  is so important to Thailand that a  saying in that
country  is,  "When you destroy  rice  you destroy  Thailand."  The Thai
Government earns much of its foreign exchange by selling rice to coun-
tries  like Japan and India.
Both the Thai Government  and the Thai people take a dim view of
the  competition  that we  give  them in  the world food  market with  our
Public  Law  480 program.  We often forget that although we may feed
some  hungry  people  by selling  wheat  to India and  Japan  at  discount
prices,  we may at the same time hurt the Thai peasant who needs  to sell
rice  to India  to keep up  the  price  of rice  in  Thailand.  Our friends  in
Canada,  Argentina,  Australia,  and New  Zealand  (major exporters  of
68wheat)  are often resentful of the  way we deal  with our surplus  wheat
abroad.
The  Thai  rice  farmer,  the  Canadian  wheat  farmer-these  are  the
sorts  of  people  we  should  also  think  of  in  our  disposal  of  surpluses
abroad,  in addition to those who receive the food. Every country of the
non-Communist world  is  important  to us in some way.  Can  we afford
to run the risk of antagonizing  even the smallest of these?
Let's take one last look at the world-this time at a simplified map
of world politics.  We could crudely  divide  the world  into  three major
blocs:  (1)  the  Communists;  (2)  the highly industrialized  Western  de-




The Communist bloc (led by Russia)  and the Western bloc  (led by
the  United  States)  are  engaged  in  a  courtship  contest for  the  under-
developed  nations  which,  on  the  whole,  can  be  considered  as  largely
uncommitted.  We  have pacts  with  many of  these  nations,  but  a  pact
doesn't  insure that they,  with their different  cultural heritage  and low-
income level,  will not shortly prefer a pact with the Soviet Union if the
Communist  terms look more attractive.
The communications  revolution,  which has taken  place during this
twentieth  century,  has  begun  to  make  people  of  the  underdeveloped
world aware that poverty doesn't have to be. They are becoming aware
of what we have-things  like  television,  automobiles,  mass education,
69mass  literacy,  the ability  to  put sputniks  up  in  the  air-and  they  are
starting  to want what we have.
This  new  awareness  and desire,  this  "revolution  in  rising expecta-
tions" plays an important role in today's cold war courtship. The under-
developed  nations  know  that both the United  States and  Russia  have
the  sorts  of  material  things  they would like  to have.  We wonder,  and
Russia  wonders,  what method  these nations  will choose in order to  at-
tain their aspirations.
During  the past  fifteen  years the  West has been loosening  its hold
on  the underdeveloped  world.  Twenty-one new nations have appeared
in the wake of the seemingly inevitable trek of Western colonialism out
of the  underdeveloped  world.  During this  same  period,  and seemingly
just  as  inevitably,  the  Communist  world has  been expanding  its  influ-
ence persistently  over the face of Asia.
Since the focus of the cold war courtship  is on the underdeveloped,
largely  uncommitted  world,  let's  concentrate  for  a  while  on  this  seg-
ment.
III.  THE UNDERDEVELOPED  WORLD
Only 21  percent  of  the  world's  population  and  27  percent  of the
world's  area can be classified as economically developed  and outside  of
Communist  domination.  About  35  percent  of the  world's  population
living in about 26 percent of the world's area is under Communist dom-
ination.  This  leaves  close to  50 percent  of the world's people  living in
the underdeveloped  and  uncommitted  areas  (Table  1).
TABLE  1. WORLD  POPULATION  AND  AREA
Percent  of World's  Percent  of World's
Bloc  Population  Area
West  21  27
Communist  35  26
Underdeveloped  44  47
United States  6  7
SOURCE:  "Great  Decisions  1959,"  Fact  Sheet  2,  Foreign  Policy  Association,  Inc.,
New York,  1958;  Edward B. Espenshade,  Editor,  Goode's World Atlas, Rand  McNally,
Chicago,  1953.
About half of the United States' trade  is with these underdeveloped
areas  (Table  2).  We obtain  from  them not only the rubber,  tin, man-
ganese, and other strategic minerals that are required to keep our indus-
trial complex functioning,  but also the spices  and other consumer goods
that help to make up our high level of living.  We indeed have a stake in
their well-being.




SOURCE:  Department  of Commerce  by  International  Economic  Analysis  Division,
Bureau  of Foreign Commerce  from  basic  data  of the  Bureau of the  Census, July  1958,
as  quoted in  The  World Almanac 1959, New  York World-Telegram,  New  York,  1959,
p. 675.
Measured  in calories,  the food supply of economically underdevel-
oped  countries is  17 percent less than  is necessary for minimum health
and perhaps a third less than in the more advanced countries  (Table  3).
But when a count is taken of the needs of the human body for the rela-
tively expensive protective  foods,  such as milk and meat, the disparity
in nutrition is  very much greater.
TABLE  3.  AVERAGE  DIET  IN  UNDERDEVELOPED  AREAS
COMPARED  WITH  MINIMUM  HEALTH  STANDARD
Area  Calories
Underdeveloped  countries  2,200
United  States  3,100
Minimum  (Health  Standard of  FAO)  2,650
SOURCE:  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  of  the  United  Nations,  Production
Yearbook, 1958,  and  The State of  Food and Agriculture, 1957.
The average  life expectancy  in economically underdeveloped  coun-
tries  is only  36 years  compared  with  67  years  in  the developed  coun-
tries. Parents must expect to lose a large proportion of their children at
birth or in infancy.
Only 35  percent of these people can read and write, compared with
95  percent in developed  areas.  The opportunity to attend school is  still
limited to less than half of the children of school  age (Table  4).
TABLE  4.  LIFE  EXPECTANCY  AND  LITERACY
Life
Area  Expectancy  Literacy
Years  Percent
Developed  areas  67  95
Underdeveloped  Areas  36  35
SOURCE:  Fact Sheet,  Committee  for  International  Economic  Growth,  Washington,
D. C.
Although income  cannot be compared  accurately  dollarwise,  indi-
cations are that each person in the underdeveloped  areas  averages only
71the equivalent  of about $126  income  per year.  In Western  Europe the
income  is  about  $1,400  per  person  and  in  the  United  States  about
$2,000  (Table 5).
TABLE  5.  AVERAGE  INCOME  PER  PERSON  PER  YEAR
IN  DEVELOPED  AND  UNDERDEVELOPED  AREAS
Area  Income
United  States  $2,000
Western  Europe  1,400
Latin America  190
Middle  East  158
Southeast  Asia  125
Africa  85
South Asia  74
SOURCE:  Same  as  for Figure  5.
In  most  of  the  underdeveloped  areas,  at  least  two  out  of  three
people,  and sometimes  as many  as  85 percent,  are engaged  in farming
(Table  6).  It  is  ironic  that  the  more people  engaged  in  farming  in  a
country,  the less the people have  to eat.
TABLE  6.  PERCENT  OF  TOTAL  LABOR  FORCE  IN  AGRICULTURE
Area  Percent  Area  Percent
Belgian  Congo  85  Mexico  58
Thailand  85  U.S.S.R.  52
Bolivia  72  Argentina  25
India  71  Western  Europe  22
Pakistan  65  United States  11
Brazil  58
SOURCE:  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  of  the  United  Nations,  Production
Yearbook,  1958,  Vol.  12,  pp.  19-21.
Why  is it  that  two-thirds  of the  world's  income  is in  the  Western
bloc and most  of the world's  population  is elsewhere?  What  is  the his-
tory  of the development  of the major cultural differences  on this earth?
IV.  HOW  DID  WE  GET  THIS  WAY?
Although  the  world  can  conveniently  be  divided  into  three major
blocs as  we have  been doing  so far-the Western,  Communist,  and Un-
derdeveloped-dividing  the  world  into several  major  cultural  areas  or
realms might be  helpful and more  accurate  (Figure  9).
We are already familiar with the generalized outline of Western and
Russian culture.  Dividing the rest of the world into broad cultural areas
would  probably require  recognition  of  at least  these additional  major
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Figure  9
SOURCE:  Bruce  Smith,  International and  Intercultural Communication: A  Theo-
retical Model,  Manuscript  for  a  forthcoming  book;  and  Russell  and  Kniffen,  Culture
Worlds, Macmillan,  New  York,  1951.
cultures:  Latin  American,  Negro  African,  Arabian,  Hindu,  Chinese,
Japanese,  and  Southeast Asian.
History of  Major Cultural Differences
Going back to man's emergence  from the Stone Age and following
the  development  of  his  cultures  through  time,  we  find  that  Chinese,
Hindu,  pre-Babylonic,  and Egyptian  civilizations  were  the  first to  ap-
pear and that two  of these  civilizations  are still with  us. The Arabian,
Japanese,  Southeast  Asian,  and  Negro  African  cultural  boundaries
were fairly well determined before the emergence of the Western World
as we know it. Most recent to make their appearance  are Russian, Latin
American,  and  Western  cultures.
Being old and powerful, the Hindu and Chinese cultures have, over
the centuries, found ways of crowding many people into their particular
corners  of the  earth.  These people, for instance, have developed  many
leguminous crops  (field beans, soybeans,  cowpeas, and others)  to fur-
nish protein in their diets. Thus,  they can  get along without the  luxury
of  using  land  to raise  animals  for protein.  They  have developed  reli-
gions which  have helped them to be happy  with the  few material  pos-
sessions  they have had. They have developed settlement patterns which
concentrate  the people  into villages  and  save the majority of the land
for cultivation.
73During  the  past  thousand  years,  the  Hindu  and  Chinese  cultures
have been  repeatedly  harassed  by  younger  and  more  vigorous  neigh-
boring cultures:  Moslem,  Mongolian,  Western,  and now  Russian.  The
history  of  the  rapid expansion  of these  neighboring  cultures  has  been
linked with  advancing  technology  and important messages.
The  Mongols,  with  the  technology  of  skillful  horsemanship  and
improved  organization  under the leadership  of Genghis  Khan,  swiftly
conquered  most  of Asia.  But  their conquest  was  short-lived-perhaps
for  lack  of  a  message  which  the  Moslems  had.  Where  the  Moslems
went,  they tended  to stay.  They  had not only technology  but also  the
message  of a  new monotheistic  religion.
During  its  period  of  great  expansion  the  West  had  such  technol-
ogies as  improved navigation  and gunpowder.  It also had the messages
of the Renaissance  and the Reformation.  These  technologies  and mes-
sages,  plus  the  industrial  revolution  and  the  challenge  of  new  land,
helped the West to accomplish  its four-or-five-hundred-year  "great leap
forward."
Now Russian  Communism,  with its technology  equal to that of the
West,  is expanding  and carrying  with it yet another message,  "Follow
us.  We  will  show  you how  to  get economic  development  in  a hurry!"
That  the message has truth in  it has been demonstrated  in the  test plot
of Russia.  It is getting  another demonstration  in China. The message  is
not only powerful,  but it is one that the underdeveloped  peoples  of the
world  find particularly  enticing  during this  period  of the  revolution  of
rising expectations.
The  presence  of  this  vigorous  expanding  Communist  culture,  to-
gether with its powerful  technology and powerful message,  is one of the
major challenges  to the  United States'  foreign policy.
V.  FOREIGN  POLICY  OBJECTIVE,  ALTERNATIVES,  TOOLS
Objective
The  late Secretary  of State  John  Foster  Dulles  once explained  to
the Senate  Foreign Relations Committee,  "The  interests  of the United
States, which our foreign policy would safeguard and promote, include:
the lives and homes of our people, their confidence  and peace of mind,
their  economic  well-being,  and  their  ideals."  Dulles  pointed  out  that
because  the greatest  threat to these interests  is war, which  today might
mean the destruction  of civilization  itself,  the  primary objective  of the
United States' policy  is to  assure a just and lasting peace.
History  records  the  conflict  between  cultures.  Today  we  find our-
selves involved in just one  moment of a long, drawn out, or protracted
74conflict between cultures. This conflict provides the reason for a foreign
policy.  It threatens  the very existence  of our culture.
Hence our number one foreign policy goal might be crystallized in
one word-survival. This includes not only our lives, but survival of our
culture,  including  such  things  as  our  ideals,  our  well-being,  and  our
ability to progress.  The founders of our government  included all this in
the  expression,  "life, liberty,  and  the pursuit of happiness."
Alternatives
This  "passing  moment"  in the protracted  conflict  is  different  from
others in the world's history. The  conflict is now  global. The conflict is
between highly civilized  cultures.  Space age technology  makes violence
in  cultural conflict  so  dangerous  it would  seem  incredible  that war  is
considered  a possibility. But in a world of people hungry for power, for
well-being,  for  self-determination,  or just plain hungry,  the world  is  a
powder  keg,  and  the  world's  leaders  are  playing  with  matches  that
might at any moment light the fuse.
In order  to  achieve  our  foreign  policy  goal  we  have,  in  a  broad
sense,  several  possible  courses  of  action:  (1)  attempt  to preserve  the
status quo; (2)  initiate  a revolutionary  offensive;  (3)  try to roll  back
Communism;  (4)  any  combination  of  these  courses  of action.
If we decide that preserving the status quo is in our best interest, we
will probably want to:
a.  Strive  to contain  Communism in  its present area.
b.  Insist on the integrity of national boundaries as they exist today.
c.  Support existing governments,  regardless  of their ideologies.
d.  Preserve  the  world  balance  of power  as  it now  stands  in  the
hope that it will prevent  an all-out war.
e.  Sweat out the  evolution  of the  Communist society  in  the hope
that it will evolve into something  less threatening.
If we decide that our best interest  is served by embarking on a revo-
lutionary offensive,  this might involve:
a.  Promoting  economic  and social development  the world over.
b.  Using power  as an  agent of policy.
c.  Working  toward  freedom  for  the  development  of diverse  cul-
tures,  interests,  and convictions  as long  as  these do not impair
the same freedom for others.
d.  Striving to extend democratic institutions and freedom concepts
over the whole  of the earth.
75If  we  decide  to follow  a  policy  of rolling back Communism  we
might:
a.  Play  the "volunteer"  game  against the  Communists.
b.  Intensify  our  propaganda  efforts  behind  the  Communist
borders.
c.  Get  ready  to strike  the first  blow  against  the  Communists,  in-
stead of waiting for them to be the  aggressor.
Tools
The protracted  conflict is carried on with a variety of tools.  Among
these  are  hot wars,  cold  wars,  propaganda  wars,  diplomacy,  treaties,
and  alliances.  Additional tools  are technological  aid, grants,  economic
development,  trade  agreements,  subversive  infiltration,  and  cultural
and educational  exchange.
We could  not possibly analyze  all of the economic,  social,  and po-
litical consequences  of each  of our foreign  policy  alternatives.  But let
us at least examine  one current  foreign policy program  as  a case study
and see how it squares  with the two  alternatives described  as "preserv-
ing the status quo" and as "a  revolutionary offensive." Let's look at our
Mutual  Security Program.
VI.  A  LOOK  AT  MUTUAL  SECURITY
Mutual  Security  is  a  multibranched  action  program  which  uses a
variety  of foreign  policy  tools.
The  Mutual  Security  idea  is based  on the  knowledge  that  the very
real  Russian  threat cannot  be resisted  by  any  one nation  single-hand-
edly-not  even  by  the  strongest  nation  in  the  non-Communist  world.
Even  the United  States with  its  vast  resources  doesn't  have enough  to
"go it alone."  Imports are vitally necessary  to our industry.  We import
all of our tin and more than half of such strategic  minerals  as  bauxite,
cobalt,  and tungsten  (Table  7).
TABLE  7.  IMPORTS  OF  STRATEGIC  MATERIALS  ESSENTIAL  TO
UNITED  STATES  INDUSTRY
Percent  Percent
Commodity  Imported  Commodity  Imported
Natural  rubber  100  Antimony  89
Tin  100  Bauxite  85
Industrial  diamonds  100  Manganese  ore  85
Graphite  100  Cobalt  81
Platinum  metals  97  Tungsten  64
Chromite  93  Mercury  56
SOURCE:  Department  of State,  Defense,  and International  Cooperation  Administra-
tion, Mutual Security Program, Fiscal Year  1960, A  Summary Presentation, 1959, p.  9.
76The mutual security of the non-Communist world depends on keep-
ing enough  of the  world's productive  resources  outside of Communist
control  to  protect  ourselves  against  a  Soviet  economic  stranglehold.
Mutual security depends on other things too, of course,  but this is cer-
tainly  a basic  requirement.
The balance  of the  world's  known  resources  lies  largely  with the
nations other than the Communist bloc or the United States  (Table  8).
TABLE  8.  WORLD  BALANCE  OF  RESOURCES
United  Rest of non-  Communist
Resource  States  Communist World  Bloc
Percent of World's Supply
Population  6  59  35
Area  7  67  26
Steel  29  42  29
Coal  20  39  41
Crude petroleum  37  49  14
Primary aluminum  41  39  20
Electric power  39  42  19
Merchant fleet  22  75  3
SOURCE:  Ibid., p.  18.
These  nations  are  largely  the uncommitted  nations  of  the  under-
developed  world,  the  "courted"  nations  of today's cold-war  courtship.
We  reason  that  our security  depends  on keeping  the  non-Communist
nations  outside  of the Iron Curtain,  in other words,  containing  Com-
munism.  This  is the logic of Mutual Security.
Our Present Mutual  Security  Program
The  suggested  1960 Mutual  Security Budget of  3.9 billion dollars
represents  about 5 percent of the total United States Government bud-
get.  This  amount is  less  than  1 percent of our nation's  income  (Gross
National  Product).
By far the largest chunk, 41 percent, of 1960 Mutual Security funds
goes for direct military  assistance  (Table  9).
TABLE  9.  SUGGESTED  MUTUAL  SECURITY  APPROPRIATION  FOR  1960
Purpose  Millions  Percent
Military  assistance  and
defense  support  $2,435  62
Development  Loan  Fund  700  18
Special  assistance,  contingency
fund,  and other  584  15
Technical  cooperation  211  5
Total  $3,930  100
SOURCE:  Ibid., p.  xxii.
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ing in the proper use of this  equipment, and  (3)  supplies  and services
furnished directly  to  foreign military  forces.
Defense support takes another sizable chunk of the Mutual Security
funds  (21  percent).  Defense  support  may  include  costs  of  feeding,
clothing,  housing,  moving,  and  paying troops.  It may  also include  the
cost of building defense  communications,  military roads,  harbors,  and
airfields.
Another sizable amount of the 1960 appropriation request  (18  per-
cent)  is  for  the  Development  Loan Fund which  is  used  to  encourage
economic  development  abroad by  providing loans.
Five percent of the 1960 Mutual Security Program will go for tech-
nical  cooperation-popularly  known  as  Point  4.  By providing  know-
how,  Point  4  teaches  the  people  of  "friendly  governments"  the  basic
technical  skills needed  for economic  development.
Fifteen  percent  of  the  funds  are  for  several  other  aspects  of  the
Mutual  Security  Program  which  are  neither  clearly  developmental
nor  military  in  nature.  These  include  special  assistance,  the  contin-
gency  fund,  and  other programs.
Russia's  Bid  for the Uncommitted  Nations
While  the Communist bloc  of nations has occasionally  used grants
of  arms  in  its  attempts  to  win uncommitted  nations  to  its  side,  it  has
relied  more heavily  on trade,  development  loans,  technical  assistance,
and  anti-Western  propaganda.
Russia's  economic  and  technical  assistance  program  has  been
aimed  mainly  toward  non-Communist Asia  and  the Near  East.  In the
crucial  rim  of Asia,  the Russians  have emphasized  economic  aid  to  a
far  greater  degree  than military  aid.  Only  about  20  percent  of  their
credit  and grant  agreements  have been military.
The  Communist  propaganda  offensive  is  directed  mainly  to  the
common people  of the world.  The Communist bloc  seems  to be taking
advantage  of  the  fact  that  any  society  tends  to  divide  itself  into  an
elite group  (which controls much  of the power),  one or more counter-
elite  groups  (which are  trying  to  seize  the  power from  the  elite),  and
the  majority  of  the  people  (the  common  people  or  the  masses  who
follow)  (Figure  10).
The  Communists  appear  to be  sacrificing  the  immediate  coopera-
tion of the ruling elites  in many countries  in the  hope that Communist
propaganda  may  eventually  persuade  the counter-elites  and masses  to
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Figure  10
join the Communist camp  against the elites.  The United States,  on the
other hand, has tended  to cooperate  with non-Communist elite  groups
whether  such groups are supported by the mass of their people  or not.
What Policy  Does  Mutual Security  Stress?
The Mutual  Security Program  uses chiefly the foreign policy tools
of  military  assistance,  economic  assistance,  and  exchange  of  people
through  technical  assistance.  Although  it  contains  some  hints  of  the
revolutionary  offensive,  a look at the  allocation  of its funds  seems  to
indicate  that the  Mutual  Security Program  is  being  used  primarily  to
preserve the  status quo.
It seeks  to  contain  Communism  largely  through  maintaining  the
world  balance  of  military  power.  In  this  process  it  extends  aid  and
prestige  to  existing  governments,  some  of whose  ideals  are  far from
freedom  and  democracy.
These  same  tools  which  presently  emphasize  maintenance  of  the
status quo could  be  used  in an  over-all  program  for  a revolutionary
offensive.  The amounts  would  need to be increased  to make  the tools
a more effective  force,  and  their  use  would  have to  be directed  more
intensively  toward extending  democratic  institutions  and  concepts.
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roll-back.
VII.  THE  POLICY  ISSUE
As you  examine some  of our other  foreign  policies  and programs,
such as  Public  Law 480, our national defense expenditure,  our China
recognition  policy,  you  may  find  in them  also  a status quo tendency.
The  big question  in foreign  policy  today  is,  "Which  of the  broad
foreign  policy  alternatives  should  we  lean  toward,"  or  stated  another
way,  "How  much status quo, how much  revolutionary  offensive,  and
how  much  roll  back?"  What  combination  is  best  suited  to  a  nation
involved  in  a protracted  conflict?  What combination  is  best  suited  to
an era fraught  with  its  own revolutions-the  technological  revolution,
the  organizational  revolution,  and  the  revolution  of  rising  expecta-
tions?  The  decision  that  you  and  your  neighbors  make  about which
pole  to lean  toward  on this  basic  issue  in  foreign policy  may well  be
one  of the most important  decisions  you  will  ever  make.
It  will influence  the character  of future surplus  disposal  programs
abroad and thus affect the market for some of your products.  But more
important  and  far-reaching,  it  will  influence  how  your  government
uses your tax dollars in military  spending  and other phases  of foreign
policy.  It will  influence the  future  of your family,  of your way of life.
Too often the  big decisions by big government  in a big democracy
are made  as a result of pressure  by  some  small group  motivated  by its
own  selfish  interest.  The  pressure  group  often  wins  its  case  largely
because  no one  else  is  concerned  with  the particular  issue  at  stake.
Foreign policy  concerns  every  one of  us vitally,  yet few  of  us  are
vitally concerned  about foreign  policy.  Can  we run  the risk of leaving
the  big decisions  on foreign  policy  in the  hands  of  a  few,  such as  big
business,  big  labor,  big  agriculture,  the  military,  or  even  the  college
professors?
Our  ultimate  position  of  survival  or  extinction  during  the  pro-
tracted  conflict  yet  to take  place  will  depend  largely  on  the  serious-
ness  of  our  concern,  of  everyone's  concern,  with foreign  policy.
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